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ANTITRUST ECONOMICS FOR PROOF OF CONCERTED 
PRICE-FIXING: PRACTICAL POINTS FOR U.S. AND KOREAN 
ANTITRUST JURISPRUDENCE 
Chang-Su Choe* 
Abstract 
This Article addresses the U.S. antitrust approach to drawing 
inferences of concerted or independent conduct from the evidence of 
parallel pricing to provide suggestions to antitrust practice. It goes 
through the central issues that demand economic analysis and employs 
economic reasoning to set up a useful analytical framework for proof of 
price-fixing. It gives particular focus to the market structural features that 
allow for collusive price-fixing, and reviews the way that U.S. and 
Korean antitrust authorities have handled the so-called “plus factors.” 
This Article argues that it is necessary to search for better analytical 
methods to effectively distinguish independent from concerted conduct. 
It concludes that, to make reasonable and predictable economic analysis 
of the proffered evidence, a more sophisticated analytical framework 
must be properly delineated and developed on a case-by-case basis. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Adam Smith has led our modern economy to believe in the market’s 
“invisible hands.”1 But he also cautioned that “people of the same trade 
seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the 
conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some 
contrivance to raise prices.”2 This conflict between faith and fear created 
the need for antitrust law. 
 On the one hand, antitrust law intends to encourage—or at least to 
not undermine—competitors’ vigorous incentives to increase the prices 
of their goods or services in the marketplace.
3
 We trust that competition, 
as incentivized, will transfer to consumers goods and services that are 
                                                     
*A partner at the SKY Patent & Law Firm in Seoul, Korea (www.skyiplaw.com). He received 
a B.A in 1996 from Yonsei University, a J.D. in 2001 from the Loyola University Chicago School of 
Law, and a Ph.D. in 2006 from the University of Washington School of Law. His legal areas of 
emphasis are cross-border corporate and business transactions, antitrust law, and intellectual 
property law. This Article is excerpted in relevant part from his Ph.D. dissertation as amended and 
updated. 
1 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 
(R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Oxford: Clarendon Press 1976) (1776). 
2 Id. at 80. 
3  See generally GEORGE STIGLER, THE THEORY OF PRICE (3d ed. 1966) (applying 
microeconomic theory to describe how prices are determined). 
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lower priced and of better quality. On the other hand, since competitors’ 
concerted price-fixing is generally achieved by restricting output, it 
results in a socially undesirable misallocation of scarce resources.
4
 
Antitrust law exists to build up a hurdle of distrust among competitors to 
deter them from fixing prices by employing relevant corrective measures. 
  Direct evidence of collusive price fixing is hard to detect. 
Competitors will not unwittingly leave behind the kind of evidence that 
will enable an antitrust agency to initiate an investigation and later 
prevail at trial.
5
 In this regard, the absence of evidence, other than 
parallel price fixing, should not simply count as a reason for believing 
that the competitors are abiding by antitrust laws. Accordingly, we 
should not rule out the possibility of collusive price fixing. 
  This Article addresses the following question: How have Korean and 
U.S. antitrust authorities developed economic bases from which 
inferences from circumstantial evidence of parallel pricing can be drawn? 
Part II discusses how market structure can imply price fixing but is 
insufficient to conclusively prove conspiracy. Part III examines relevant 
theories of market phenomena as price fixing determinants and proposes 
a hierarchy for weighing that market evidence. Part IV probes how the 
judiciary has applied the price leadership theory, and how the judiciary’s 
understanding of this theory will affect future cases. This Article 
establishes a framework for antitrust analysis by identifying and 
analyzing relevant economic bases of Korean and U.S. antitrust laws that 
impose price fixing liability even if direct evidence is lacking. Therefore, 
this Article fleshes out the central economic issues that call for analysis 
of a relevant market’s structural features and wide-ranging market 
phenomena that may lead to collusive price fixing. In this regard, the 
Article also explores helpful similarities and differences between some 
aspects of European Union and Japanese antitrust law. The ultimate 
purpose of this Article is to construct a guideline for drawing adequate 
boundaries of circumstantial evidence and to lay out the analytical steps 
in the process of inferring price fixing by virtue of additional evidence.
6
 
                                                     
4 See W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST, ch. 5 (3d ed. 
2000). 
5 Cf. Peter G. Bryant & E. Woodrow Eckard Jr., Price Fixing: The Probability of Getting 
Caught, 73 REV. OF ECON. & STATISTICS 531, 531 (1991) (proposing a model for estimating the 
probability of catching price-fixing conspiracies and estimating the number of such schemes active 
at any given time). 
6  See Jerome A. Hochberg, Law and Enforceability: A Litigator’s Perspective, in 
REVITALIZING ANTITRUST IN ITS SECOND CENTURY: ESSAYS ON LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND 
POLITICAL POLICY 161–68 (Harry First et al., eds., 1991) (arguing that “[s]ome of the nation’s 
economic and legal talent should take some time off from opining about economic issues and 
enlarging our fund of knowledge… and, instead, devote their considerable skill and energy to trying 
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The Article argues that it is necessary to construct better analytical 
methods to effectively distinguish between independent and concerted 
conduct. It concludes that, to make economic analysis of the proffered 
evidence reasonable and predictable, a more sophisticated analytical 
framework must be properly delineated and developed on a case-by-case 
basis. 
II. INITIAL ECONOMIC BASIS: MARKET STRUCTURE AS DETERMINANT 
OF PRICE-FIXING 
A. An Opening Sketch 
 
  Professor Hovenkamp posed the following hypothetical in an article 
to show the difficulty in discovering oligopoly price coordination: 
 
[If] four gasoline stations on an intersection invariably 
wait for A to post its price every Monday morning, and 
then all of them precisely match it, an observer might say 
that the convention has become the equivalent of a verbal 
agreement. Further, B, C, and D all know that if they post 
a higher price they will make no sales; if they post a 
lower price it will be immediately matched or undercut.
7
 
 
   This simple example unfolds not only one of the most recurring 
questions that demands antitrust consideration in theory, but also one of 
the most frequently arising issues in antitrust practice. Since parallel 
pricing is easily observable and ubiquitous in the marketplace, we might 
be led to assert that interdependent pricing should not be under the 
purview of antitrust as a matter of law. From the antitrust perspective, 
however, it “purports neither to describe any particular real market nor to 
predict the competitiveness of a market with few firms or of oligopoly 
markets generally.”8 In collusion cases, the plaintiff’s viable claim can 
always be predicated on more evidence; otherwise, the plaintiff would 
not have brought the action in the first place.
9
 
                                                                                                                       
to generate data and develop simple rules and presumptions to resolve the great majority of cases, be 
they mergers or restraints or other conduct under the Sherman Act”). 
7 Herbert Hovenkamp, Book Review: The Rationalization of Antitrust, 116 HARV. L. REV 917, 
922–23 (2003). 
8  PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT J. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION para. 1434(d)(2) (2d ed. 2000). 
9 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 134–36 (2008). 
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   In a factually similar case to the above hypothetical, one U.S. court 
did not accept the plaintiff’s argument that the united facts established 
that the defendant gasoline retailer was colluding with its competitors.
10
  
The gasoline retailer consciously implemented parallel pricing, posted its 
prices on large signs, and surveyed competitor prices. Instead, stronger 
evidence effectively undermined the existence of conspiracy. During that 
market period, the retail gasoline business was competitive because there 
were at least sixty retail gasoline outlets, the defendant’s several 
competitors filed complaints of the defendant’s low gasoline prices, and 
the defendant had a declared policy of pricing at or near the lowest price 
on the market.
11
 
   The court found that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden of 
establishing that the defendant retailer participated in a conspiracy to 
raise or fix gasoline prices. The court agreed with the defendant’s 
argument that:  
 
[I]t is not unlawful for a business enterprise to take prices 
charged by its competitors into account when setting its own 
prices or to follow or copy prices of competitors so long as the 
decision to do so is the result of unilateral business judgment and 
not the result of collusive agreement.
12
  
 
   This Article will discuss, in greater depth, the complications and 
implications of the court’s reasoning as a matter of antitrust economics. 
Antitrust law takes forward and backward analytical steps to explore 
the nature of competition in a particular industry. As noted above, the 
mere absence of direct evidence in competitors’ parallel pricing does not 
necessarily indicate that price fixing is not occurring. For that reason, 
antitrust law steps forward to examine the industry’s structural indicia 
that can suggest sufficiently interdependent features of competitors, thus 
predicting the plausibility of collusive price fixing. On the other hand, 
the inherently interdependent nature of oligopoly markets can lead to 
competitors’ parallel pricing even in the absence of an illegal agreement 
among competitors. Accordingly, antitrust law steps back and asks for 
further evidence to ensure that the arguably supracompetitive prices were 
not from competitors’ interdependence but from their concerted conduct. 
  With that observation, this Article first delves into market structural 
                                                     
10 Montana v. SuperAmerica, 559 F.Supp. 298, 303 (D.Mont. 1983). 
11 Id. at 300. 
12 Id. at 301–02. 
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factors that meet the notion of interdependence and looks into their 
implications. Part III then examines what further evidence is required 
from methodological perspectives by comparing the U.S. and Korean 
antitrust jurisprudence. 
 
B. Market Structural Traits that Show Interdependence 
 
  Practitioners of both Korean and U.S. antitrust jurisprudence have 
been searching for more specific objective tests that can show that the 
parallel pricing in question is conspiratorial in its nature and extent. To 
that end, antitrust law has relied upon economic interpretations of 
evidence.
13
 In general, economic theory posits that, in a competitive 
market, there are many market players whose individual market shares 
are not significant, and that one player’s pricing decisions have a 
negligible impact on other market players or on the industry.
14
 Knowing 
their inconsequential influence on the market, players in that competitive 
market will independently decide to increase prices of their products or 
services without taking a careful look at, and aptly reacting to, what other 
competing market players are doing and will do.
15
 
  As we frequently witness, however, oligopolies dominate most of the 
real-world markets.
16
 In an oligopoly, only a few leading market players 
control the market. In such a market, the relevant players should interact 
with each other because a profit to one player, by selling one more 
product, may necessarily mean a loss to one or more other players. 
Whether a player has succeeded in the market is thus likely to be 
measured by a relative evaluation method as opposed to an absolute one. 
In an industry that has relatively few competing players, the actions and 
reactions of each player have significant impact on the conduct of 
competitors, and eventually on the general market price.
17
  
  In short, in the hypothetical competitive market, each market player 
may be ignorant of or indifferent to other players’ conduct. However, in 
                                                     
13 See F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 97 (3d ed. 1990); see also DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN 
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION ch. 5 (4th ed. 2005) (discussing the economics of a cartel market 
structure). 
14 See GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 345 (5th ed. 1998). 
15 See SUN-SIK JU, DUKGOAJUM YI GYU-JE (주순식, 독과점의 규제) [REGULATION OF 
MONOPOLY AND OLIGOPOLY MARKETS], PART 1, ch. 2, in JAYU KYUNGJANG GUA GONGJUNG 
GURAE (자유무역과 공정거래) [FREE COMPETITION AND FAIR TRADE] (Oh-Seung Kwan ed., 
2003). 
16 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, ¶ 404(a).  
17 See id. ¶ 1429. 
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an oligopoly market, each player may take into account what other 
players are considering to determine relevant pricing bases for their 
products or services.
18
 In the latter case, the market players’ conduct, 
known as economic interdependence, is the very motivating factor that 
drives competitors into making pricing decisions in a mutually dependent 
fashion.
19
 Therefore, antitrust law requires a showing of interdependence 
among competitors as an initial step of inferring unlawful price fixing 
from parallel pricing.
20
 
  The pertinent inquiry in this initial step is determining under what 
basis and to what extent interdependence can be established. Antitrust 
jurisprudence has developed an analytical way of deriving 
interdependence from a number of market factors that could sufficiently 
portend the analogous circumstances where collusive price fixing 
occurred. It is the economic theory and empirical evidence that permit us 
to predict or assume the plausibility of price-fixing in a particular 
market.
21
 Hence, economic analysis of the structural features seeks to 
discover interdependence.
22
 
  As shown by Table 1 below, antitrust economics asks various 
questions to identify the pertinent structural characteristics in 
determining the nature of competition in a particular industry.
23
 Relevant 
structural factors may be divided into two parts to better understand their 
operations.
24
 One part is composed of factors that contribute to the 
competitive significance of concentration magnitude,
25
 and the other is 
                                                     
18  For an observation of interdependence in terms of cost advantage and product 
differentiation, see MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: CREATING AND SUSTAINING 
SUPERIOR PERFORMANCE, ch. 3–4 (The Free Press, 1985); see also Dennis A. Yao & Susan S. 
DeSanti, Game Theory and the Legal Analysis of Tacit Collusion, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 113 (1993) 
(discussing tacit collusion). 
19 See SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 13, ch. 6; see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, 
para. 1411 (explaining that no conspiracy inference may be made from parallelism where there is no 
interdependence in the market). 
20 See LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 163–65 
(1977). 
21 See George Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44–61 (Feb. 1964). 
22 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, ¶ 1409; see also Barry v. Blue Cross of Cal., 
805 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1986) (“The most precise test for economic interdependence involves an 
economic analysis of an industry's market structure.”). 
23  See JOHN E. KWOKA, JR. & LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: 
ECONOMICS, COMPETITION, AND POLICY 172–80 (4th ed. 2004); see also MICHAEL E. PORTER, 
COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS 3–33, 191–
200 (1980) (explaining that market structure plays a critical role in the analysis of the amount of 
competition in an industry). 
24 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, ¶1430. 
25 For examination of further factors that may impede or facilitate collusion, see SCHERER AND 
& ROSS, supra note 13, ch. 7 & 8; see also AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, ¶¶ 1430, 
1434(d)(3) (discussing factors affecting likelihood of oligopolistic coordination and proving 
conspiracy using plus factors to prove conspiracy). 
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the variables on which competitors may rely for coordinating their price 
increases.
26
 
 
TABLE 1. Market Structural Features Conducive to Collusion 
Factors It is more economically plausible to assume 
price-fixing if each of the following is true: 
 
Degree of 
Concentration 
1.  The number of sellers is fewer; 
2.  Firms’ sizes are smaller; 
3.  Buyers are smaller and more numerous; 
4.  Entry is difficult;
27
 
 
 
Degree of 
Variables 
5.  Firms’ costs are similar;28 
6.  Product homogeneity is great;
29
 
7.  Orders are small and frequent; 
8.  Information about rivals’ prices is readily 
available;
30
 
9.  Demand is stable;
31
 and 
10.  Fixed costs are low. 
 
   
  Out of this initial analysis, antitrust tribunals generally intend not 
only to determine whether the features of highly concentrated markets 
are conducive to collusion, but also to safely single out a market that may 
not possess the basic features. On the latter occasion, antitrust tribunals 
are likely to find that collusive conduct in that market is implausible. A 
typical parallel pricing case shows that different fact patterns engage 
                                                     
26 See Brooke Grp. Ltd., v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 238 (1993) 
(finding that “[t]acit coordination is facilitated by a stable market environment, fungible products, 
and a small number of variables upon which the firms seeking to coordinate their pricing may 
focus”). For example, if products are sold primarily based on price, coordinating prices would be 
easy. For an understanding of dynamic strategies, see PORTER, supra note 23, ch. 5. 
27 If barriers to entry are high enough, concerted price-fixing will be generally unprofitable, 
and thus unlikely. 
28 If there is either declining demand or excess production capacity, market players normally 
favor price cuts as opposed to price increases. 
29 The products are homogeneous or fungible in that each is identical with its counterpart in a 
particular feature. The more homogeneous the products, the easier it is to agree on prices. In 
industries such as commodities, prices tend to be uniform. RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. 
EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 337 (2d ed. 1981).  
30 For an understanding of dynamic strategies, see PORTER, supra note 23, ch. 5. 
31 Demand is said to be price-inelastic in economics where one product is so dissimilar to 
others that a substantial increase of its price does not result in an immediate shift to the other 
products by consumers. Assuming other things are equal, a lower price elasticity of demand for the 
leading firms’ products creates more incentives to engage in collusion. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS 
49–53 (3d ed. 1994).  
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dissimilar working modes of the factors in antitrust practice. 
  The above factors have been subject to different court interpretations 
depending upon the facts of the case at hand, which may considerably 
affect the outcome of cases. Therefore, the above general interpretations 
must be tentative at this point. The structural factors in an overall 
analytical framework have a couple of functions:  1) they initially 
suggest some signs of collusive price-fixing; and 2) they subsequently 
show circumstances that may facilitate or impede collusive conduct so as 
to support or undermine the existence of price fixing. Of legal 
significance is the fact that the arguably supracompetitive prices might 
result from simple interdependence among competitors without any 
agreement. 
  Indeed, both Korean and U.S. courts have consistently found that 
consciously parallel conduct alone is not enough to establish unlawful 
collusion. In short, a showing of interdependence can let us 
presumptively but inconclusively make the inference of price fixing 
before conducting further analysis. Therefore, the interdependence that 
the market structural features suggest should stop short of telling us that 
competitors are acting conspiratorially. In a litigation setting, if the signs 
of collusive price fixing based on the market structures are found to be 
economically implausible, that might undermine a price fixing claim 
requiring a plaintiff to bear the higher burden of coming up with strong 
or convincing additional evidence; otherwise, a relatively lower burden 
of proof is conventionally required.
32
 
III. SUBSEQUENT ECONOMIC BASIS: MARKET PHENOMENA AS 
DETERMINANT OF PRICE-FIXING  
  This section examines relevant economic bases of market players’ 
conduct or performance that may strengthen or weaken the existence of 
price fixing. In particular, it analyzes the methodology of Professor 
Phillip Areeda’s treatise as a model of arguments to understand the way 
in which U.S. antitrust jurisprudence has identified and classified the 
required circumstantial evidence.
33
 Following that analysis is relevant 
additional evidence that Korean antitrust authorities have recently found. 
It concludes with a criticism of Professor Areeda’s methodology in terms 
                                                     
32 See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS 7 (5th ed. 2002). 
33 This Study turns to this multivolume treatise because it is the principal compendium that 
deals with circumstantial evidence and is most frequently cited as secondary authority by U.S. 
courts. See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra, note 8. 
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of the relevance and significance of each factor. Then, it addresses a 
desirable hierarchy for weighing the overall additional evidence. 
A. Identification of Additional Evidence 
  Antitrust jurisprudence has required so-called “plus factors” to test 
whether other factors combined with the market structural features can 
sufficiently establish the existence of collusion.
34
 Professor Areeda is 
reluctant to use the term “plus factors” because it is an “inelegant” term 
meaning “the additional facts or factors required to be proved as a 
prerequisite to finding that parallel action amounts to a conspiracy.”35 
  The U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first used the technical term 
“plus factors” in a 1952 conspiracy case. The court sustained the criminal 
convictions of the defendant and found that:
36
   
 
[A] series of ‘plus factors’ which, when standing alone and 
examined separately, could not be said to point directly to the 
conclusion that the charges of the indictment were true beyond a 
reasonable doubt, but which, when viewed as a whole, in their 
proper setting, spelled out that irresistible conclusion.
37
 
 
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has never used the term “plus 
factors” in conscious parallelism cases, virtually all of the lower U.S. 
courts have employed it as a term of art.
38
 
In his treatise on antitrust law, Professor Areeda suggests detailed 
additional evidence to distinguish mere interdependent pricing from 
collusive price fixing.
39
 It is difficult to review his methodology in full 
because his discussion of circumstantial evidence is too comprehensive 
in scope and is filled with numerous cases and examples. It is also 
unclear whether the following factors are meant to constitute all 
conceivable additional evidence. At the risk of oversimplification, 
however, this Article identifies and classifies four general categories of 
price fixing evidence as follows:
40
 
 
                                                     
34 See, e.g., Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2000Du1386, May 28, 2002 (S. Kor.).  
35 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, para. 240. 
36 C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493, 497 (9th Cir. 1952). 
37 Id. at 493. 
38 See Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541 (1954). 
39 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, ch. 14. 
40 See id. ¶¶ 1434(a)–(e); see also HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE 
LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 177–78 (2d ed. 1999) (discussing signs of collusion). 
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  (1)  Interdependence Evidence; 
-  Motive for Agreement 
-  Benefit from Agreement 
-  No Independent Reason for Challenged Behavior 
-  Acting Against Self-interest 
  (2) Evidence Found Under Traditional Conspiracy; 
-  Opportunity to Collude 
-  Motive to Desire Action in Concert  
-  An Overt Act Consistent with Concerted Action 
  (3)  Evidence of Poor Economic Performance; and 
  (4)  Evidence of Facilitating Practices. 
 
  In characterizing circumstantial evidence, Professor Areeda observes 
that the evidence falling under Categories 1 and 2 is additional evidence 
as opposed to plus factors.
41
 He recognizes, however, that some courts 
regard conspiratorial motive and Acts Against Self-interest under 
Category 1 (Interdependence Evidence) as plus factors.
42
 With respect to 
Category 1, he argues that “[t]he presence of interdependence means that 
there would be a motive for conspiracy, that an agreement would benefit 
the alleged conspirators, and that an act could offend the actor’s self-
interest unless his rivals act similarly.” 43  The Acting Against Self-
interest argument is generally made for the proposition that the alleged 
agreement is contrary to the interests of individual parties unless carried 
out together with other conspirators. The No Independent Reason for 
Challenged Behavior category is used as a counter-argument against the 
contention that relevant parties were acting against their self-interests.
44
 
  As for the Category 2 (Evidence Found Under Traditional 
Conspiracy), Professor Areeda finds that, in cases involving parallel 
conduct, the plaintiff is required to prove the following three factors: “[1] 
some easily shown opportunity to arrange the common action, [2] some 
                                                     
41 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 40, at 177–78; AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, ¶¶ 1411, 
1416 (With respect to relevant plus factors, the U.S. Supreme Court identified the two inquires: (1) 
whether the defendant has “any rational motive” to join the alleged conspiracy; and (2) whether the 
defendant’s conduct “was consistent with the defendant’s independent interest.”); see also 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 596–97 (1986) (holding that 
“if [the defendants] had no rational economic motive to conspire, and if their conduct is consistent 
with other, equally plausible explanations, the conduct does not give rise to an inference of 
conspiracy”). 
42  See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, ¶. 1434(a); William E. Kovacic, The 
Identification and Proof of Horizontal Agreements under the Antitrust Laws, THE ANTITRUST BULL., 
31–57 (Spring 1993).  
43 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, ¶. 1411. 
44 See Kovacic, supra note 42, at 39. 
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motive for the defendants to desire action in concert, and [3] an overt act 
more consistent with some pre-arrangement for common action than with 
independently arrived-at decisions.” 45  Without explicitly stating that 
oligopolistic market features are additional evidence, he characterizes 
them as “factors affecting likelihood of oligopolistic coordination” and 
places them under Category 3 (Evidence of Poor Economic 
Performance).
46
 
  Professor Areeda only considers Categories 3 (Evidence of Poor 
Economic Performance) and 4 (Evidence of Facilitating Practices) as 
plus factors. To the extent that evidence under all four categories has a 
tendency to support or weaken the existence of price fixing, Professor 
Areeda seems willing to characterize it as additional evidence as 
generally understood. It may not matter, therefore, whether some 
evidence is specified as plus factors while other evidence is not. 
  Korean antitrust jurisprudence finds the existence of plus factors as 
well. As it became necessary to handle the increased collusion cases 
properly, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) set forth the 
“Reviewing Criteria for Concerted Conduct,” which lists four types of 
additional evidence and their corresponding examples: 
 
(1) Where there is evidence of direct/indirect 
communications or exchange of information; 
 
(2) Where the price increases could contribute to the 
enterprises’ interests only if performed by concerted conduct 
and they could be against individual enterprise’s interests if 
individually performed; 
 
(3) Where the coincidence of the conduct is not justified in 
terms of legitimate business purposes; and 
 
(4) Where it is difficult to achieve concerted conduct absent 
some sort of agreement given the current industry structure.
47
 
 
                                                     
45 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, ¶ 1416. 
46 Id. ¶¶ 1430, 1434(d)(3). 
47 See KOREA FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, REVIEWING CRITERIA FOR CONCERTED CONDUCT, 
1–3 (Aug. 21, 2009); see also THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST 
GUIDELINES FOR COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS (2000), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/04/ftcdojguidelines.pdf (discussing U.S. standards for evaluating 
agreements among competitors). 
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  In practice, the KFTC has found that, to infer concerted action from 
conscious parallelism, the following plus factors should be considered as 
a whole in addition to the parallel price increases of products. Authorities 
should consider whether:  
 
 A rational motive or reason exists for concerted action;  
 A firm is acting against its self-interest unless the action is 
performed with other conspirators;  
 Market situations exist that cannot be explained by ways 
other than concerted action;  
 A firm has past violations of antitrust law;  
 Direct communication such as meetings is present among 
alleged conspirators;  
 There has been a mutual exchange of information;  
 Data has been exchanged through trade association meetings;  
 A common or similar price calculation formula has been 
adopted among oligopolists; and  
 Industrial structure can make collusion easier.48 
 
  Until recently, the Korean Supreme Court had not held what 
evidence could come under the plus factors.
49
 However, in 2003, the 
Court held that in weighing the circumstances that can rebut the 
presumed concerted action, a court should reasonably consider the 
additional evidence as a whole according to the general norms of 
business transactions.
50
 The Court listed plus factors that are broader in 
scope than what the KFTC had found above. They include:  
 
 The characteristics and current situations in a relevant 
product market; 
                                                     
48 See Ju Posteel Yi Budanghan Gongdonghangwi Mit Gwajinggeum Jaesanjeongye Daehan 
Geon ((주)포스틸의 부당한 공동행위 및 과징금 재산정에 대한 건)) [In re Collusion and 
Fine Recalculation of POSCO Steel Service & Sales Co., Ltd.], (2001 독점 1934) 
[2001DokJum1934], Korea Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision 2001-126, (Sept. 10, 2001) (S. Kor.).  
49 See SOO-IL SON, GONGDONG HANGWI(CARETEL) YI GYUJEI WA CHOOJEONG JOHANG YI 
MOONJEIJEOM KYUNGJABYUP YI JEMUNJE, BYUPWON DOSEOKWAN (손수일, 
공동행위(카르텔)의 규제와 추정조항의 문제점) [REGULATION OF CONCERTED ACTION 
(CARTELS) AND PROBLEMS OF THE PRESUMPTION CLAUSE], ch. 5, in Kyungjaebyup Yi Jeimoonjei, 
Byupwon Doseokwan (경제법의 제문제, 법원도서관) [THE PROBLEMS OF ECONOMIC LAWS, the 
Court Library] (Case Information No. 87, 2000); see also CHAN-MOO HUR, Kongjong Korae Byup 
Kwa Cartel Kyujae (공정거래법과 카르텔규제) [ANTITRUST LAW AND CARTEL REGULATION] 
(2000). 
50 See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Du5552, Dec. 12, 2003 (S. Kor.); see also Supreme Court 
[S. Ct.], 2002Du4648, May 27, 2003 (S. Kor.).  
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 The nature and type of products involved; 
 Distribution networks in the marketplace; 
 The structure of price determinants; 
 Various internal and external effects on market price; 
 The positions that each firm holds in the field; 
 Each firm’s profits as a result of price changes; 
 The effects on relative market shares; 
 The legitimacy of business judgment in view of 
individual firms’ business conditions; 
 The actual conditions for direct exchange of ideas (for 
example, meetings among firms); 
 The degree of probability that coincidence could result 
even in the absence of discussion; 
 The experience of price imitation and past violations; and 
 The economic policy background.51 
 
  Although different fact patterns require differing plus factors, the 
review of plus factors in U.S. and Korean antitrust jurisprudence 
suggests that the factors are not substantially different and have many 
common elements, such as Acting Against Self-interest or Opportunities 
to Coordinate Prices. However, this Article could not find any viable 
discussion as to the relevance and significance of each factor and an 
applicable hierarchy in to weigh them.
52
 Korean antitrust law includes 
almost the full range of imaginable circumstances. If the listed plus 
factors are intended to build an extensive framework, that is well and 
good, but simply listing plus factors is of no help in analyzing 
complicated facts to the extent that antitrust tribunals are forced to rely 
on the relative value and weight of the factors in deciding cases. 
B.  Evaluation of the Categories and Types 
  The relevance and significance of each plus factor should be based, 
in large part, upon each factor’s power of persuasion or explanation. We 
will be able to us to assess the proffered factors against one another by 
doing so, and offer reasonable hierarchical orders among them.
53
 
                                                     
51 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2001Du5552, Dec. 12, 2003 (S. Kor.). 
52 See Michael K. Vaska, Conscious Parallelism and Price-fixing: Defining the Boundary, 52 
U. CHI. L. REV. 508 (1985). 
53 See Hovenkamp, supra note 7, at 924–25. 
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Professor Areeda has entered so many factors into the categories 
presumably because the relevant part of his treatise is designed to cover 
inferential proof of collusion from all concerted conduct as well as 
parallel pricing. But different collusive behaviors (such as bid-rigging, 
market allocation, or group boycott) require different methodological 
formulations for adequate analysis. For the purposes of this Article, the 
evaluation is conducted in the context of parallel pricing only. 
1. Evidence to Show Interdependence 
  Professor Areeda’s model has four factors that show competitors’ 
interdependence: (1) Motive for Agreement, (2) Benefit from Agreement, 
(3) No Independent Reason for Challenged Behavior, and (4) Acting 
Against Self-interest.
54
 He seems to argue that market structural features 
alone are not enough to show interdependence. In addition to the features, 
one or more of the four factors must be established to show 
interdependence. As far as the four factors are concerned, Professor 
Areeda’s methodology appears different from that of most antitrust 
tribunals and scholars because he quite broadly construes the notion of 
interdependence.  
  First, he notes that some consider Factors 1 and 2 to be the same. The 
reason that competitors wish to enter into agreements is apparently to 
obtain certain profits by virtue of concerted action.
55
 Professor Areeda 
also places the Factor 3 (No Independent Reason for Challenged 
Behavior) into Category 1 (Interdependence Evidence).
56
 However, the 
element should not be considered a separate plus factor because in 
practice, presence or absence of independent, legitimate business 
justifications almost always serves as a defense to every single plus 
factor that underlies a plaintiff’s argument. 57  It may be better to 
designate the factor as one distinct category of defenses or counter-
arguments. Accordingly, the four factors under Category 1 could be 
narrowed down to two factors: a Motive to Collude and Acting Against 
One’s Self-interest. 
  To evaluate the relevance and significance of the two elements, we 
may need to go to the fundamental underpinnings of economics. To 
                                                     
54 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, ¶¶ 1434(a)–(e) 
55 See id. ¶1434(c)(1). 
56 Id. ¶¶ 1434(a)–(e). 
57  See Kovacic, supra note 42, at 55–57; see also Emil John Kotalik, Jr., Conscious 
Parallelism: The Business Judgment Defense in a Summary Judgment Context, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 
115 (1983) (discussing the business judgment defense in conscious parallelism cases). 
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someone untrained in economics, this subject may seem to be one of 
complex statistics, numbers, tables, and charts. As a social science, 
however, economics is the study of what constitutes rational human 
behaviors in an endeavor to fulfill one’s needs and wants. For that 
purpose, economics makes two related assumptions—market players will 
aim to fulfill their self-interests, and individual players are rational in 
their efforts to achieve their unlimited needs and wants.
58
 
  These economic assumptions allow us to appreciate each alleged 
conspirator’s motive to participate in concerted plans with competitors to 
increase prices in an oligopolistic market.
59
 As discussed below, Factor 4 
(Acting Against Self-interest) can also perform the same function as that 
of Factor 1 (Motive for Agreement).
60
 The element of Motive to Collude 
may thus “count for little or nothing.”61 
  As for Factor 4, Professor Areeda notes that this factor has the 
“screening function” of checking for the existence of interdependence.62 
He does not, however, give this factor priority over other factors in the 
hierarchy. It is somewhat curious that although many courts and 
commentators are willing to consider this as a plus factor, few give 
definite explanations as to why it is relevant and significant.  
  Factor 4 should be the very first factor to be tested because it has 
important legal significance.
63
 It may be self-evident that any statement 
or conduct against one’s self-interest is trustworthy. Rather than putting 
that observation in an analytical framework, it would be better to 
explicitly premise the reason upon economic theory. The issue is whether 
a firm is acting against its unilateral self-interest since its price increases 
would only make sense as part of a concerted scheme. If the answer is 
yes, it completely challenges the economic assumption upon which 
antitrust law is firmly built, and it provides evidence that the alleged 
conspirators are agreeing to anti-competitive behavior. Because a 
                                                     
58 See EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (1994). 
59 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, para. 1431(c)(1); see also Jonathan B. Baker, 
Two Sherman Act Section 1 Dilemmas: Parallel Pricing, the Oligopoly Problem, and Contemporary 
Economic Theory, 38 ANTITRUST BULL. 143, 143–219, n.60 (1993) ( “[W]hy, after all, would the 
parties reach an agreement unless they were up to no good?”); see also E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & 
JEFFRY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 185–188 
(4th ed. 2003) (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s treatment of conscious parallelism). 
60 See STEPHEN F. ROSS, PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 163–165 (1993). 
61  ERNEST GELLHORN, WILLIAM KOVACIC, & STEPHEN CALKINS, ANTITRUST LAW AND 
ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL 282 (5th ed. 2004). 
62 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, ¶ 1415. 
63 See SULLIVAN & HOVENKAMP, supra note 31, at 297–98. But see Michael D. Blechman, 
Conscious Parallelism, Signaling and Facilitating Devices: The Problem of Tacit Collusion Under 
the Antitrust Laws, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 881 (1979) (addressing the problem of oligopolist price-
fixing in the absence of any express agreement to restrain trade). 
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showing that defendants were acting against their self-interest provides 
us with a primary light in viewing market players’ conduct and 
performance, this factor should be highly ranked in assessing all plus 
factors. 
 
2. Traditional Conspiracy Evidence 
 
  Professor Areeda argues that the following three factors must exist in 
collusion: (1) Opportunity to Collude, (2) Motive to Collude, and (3) An 
Overt Act Consistent with Furthering Concerted Action (versus an act 
furthering independent action).
64
 As he put it, the evidence found under 
a traditional conspiracy is almost identical to the proof of evidence 
required under criminal conspiracy laws.
65
 However, in the antitrust 
context, the Factors 2 and 3 under this second category should not be 
considered relevant plus factors. The Motive to Collude here does not 
appear to be different from the Motive for Agreement factor under 
Category 1 (Evidence to Show Interdependence). Thus motive to collude 
should not operate as a plus factor. 
  Although we almost always find certain overt acts in collusion cases, 
we do not need to establish them as plus factors in practice because they 
are irrelevant. The evidence included is simply based upon our after-the-
fact observation as opposed to its quality as a plus factor. In any 
conceivable antitrust litigation involving parallel pricing, there has been 
evidence that competitors set foot on uniform or similar price increases 
for a product or service and that they have contacted each other through 
telephone calls, fax-transmittals, e-mails, and so on.
66
 We are already 
inferring concerted action, starting from the very first evidence of certain 
overt acts of parallel price movements.
67
 A more relevant inquiry then, is 
whether parallel pricing as an overt act is significant enough to be 
suspicious of collusive price-fixing.
68
 
  In parallel pricing cases, it may be proper to characterize the 
                                                     
64 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, ¶. 1416. 
65 Id. ¶ 1417(b). 
66 See OH-SEUNG KWAN ET AL., GONGJUNG GERRAEBUP SYMGYUL YE BAKSUN (권오승 등 
공저, 공정거래법 심결례 100선) [100 CASES IN FINDINGS OF THE FAIR TRADE COMMISSION] 
(1996). 
67 See In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 662 (7th Cir. 2002). 
68 In fact Professor Areeda’s methodology also contains significant price parallelism because 
“incredibly” simultaneous price increases are generally found in conspiracy findings. See AREEDA & 
HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, ¶ 1425 (this section is titled “‘Unnatural Parallelism’ Too Close for 
Coincidence and Unexplainable by Mere Interdependence: Actions Contrary to Self-interest”). 
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evidence that defendants had substantial opportunities to coordinate 
prices as a plus factor. To weigh the anecdotal evidence, courts consider 
the credibility of written documents, witness statements, or testimony to 
rely on in deciding cases, which is a matter of the court’s sole discretion. 
If we collected a substantial degree of credible evidence of inter-firm 
contacts, we would not need to worry about taking into account 
additional evidence. In other words, the opportunity to collude does not 
have much evidentiary power; otherwise, we would not have cases 
contestable enough to get into a courtroom.
69
 
3. Other Evidence 
  Professor Areeda defines Category 3 (Evidence of Poor Economic 
Performance) as comprising various factors even if narrowly interpreted. 
Illustrative are a defendant’s restriction or curtailment of output, stable 
market shares, and prices that fail to fluctuate with demand, high profit 
margins, data, or long-run patterns of price identity. Besides these, he 
inserts the evidence of market structure examined in Part II into Category 
3.
70
 
  As noted above, the market structural features that have led us to 
assume the plausibility of collusion can also functionally operate as 
circumstances that impede or facilitate price coordination possibilities.
71
 
It is true that the probative value of structural evidence is highly likely to 
depend on interpretations of various economic theories and arguments.
72
 
Still, the variable market features are relevant evidence as long as they 
tend to have evidentiary strength in supporting or weakening the 
existence of collusion. Additionally, they should be placed into a 
disparate plus factor because the variables may be ranked differently 
among themselves at the hierarchical levels within an analytical 
framework. 
  Finally, as legitimate business justification defenses apply to a every 
plaintiff’s plus-factor-related argument, so do facilitating practices.73 
Facilitating practices mean those practices that tend to make it easier for 
firms to reach agreements or otherwise coordinate their behavior in an 
                                                     
69 See id. ¶ 1417(b). 
70 Id. ¶¶ 1430, 1434(d)(3). 
71 See id. ¶ 1434(d). 
72 Understandably, Professor Areeda is quite skeptical of the effectiveness of the factor’s 
operation in practice, noting that “[u]nfortunately, most actual cases show too many substantial 
uncertainties in appraising both the strength of the various impediments to oligopolistic collaboration 
and the degree of non-competitive performance.” Id. para. 1434(d)(3). 
73 See id. ¶ 1434(e). 
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anticompetitive manner, to detect divergence from such agreements or 
coordination, and to punish such divergence. The practices should be 
categorized into one plus factor, not because they are not related to other 
factors (they are), but because looking at it in isolation allows us to better 
appreciate the interaction of the factor with other plus factors. 
IV. THE JUDICIARY’S UNDERSTANDING OF OLIGOPOLY PRICING 
  Part II discussed the theoretical and practical limits of what antitrust 
law should and can do about parallel pricing conduct. This section 
focuses on how and to what extent the contemporary judiciary has 
recognized the price leadership theory and how their economic 
understandings may affect the outcome of cases.
74
 The recent findings of 
Korean reviewing courts seem highly similar to European Union antitrust 
jurisprudence but slightly different from Japanese antitrust jurisprudence. 
In addition to Korean and U.S. antitrust cases, Part IV briefly reviews the 
modern European Union and Japanese antitrust approaches to 
understanding oligopoly pricing in deciding parallel pricing cases. 
A. The U.S. Antitrust Jurisprudence 
  Economics Professor F. M. Scherer defines the price leadership 
theory as follows: 
 
Price leadership implies a set of industry practices or 
customs under which list price changes are normally 
announced by a specific firm accepted as the leader by 
others, who follow the leader’s initiatives. Wide 
variations are possible in the stability of the leader’s 
position, the reasons for its acceptance as leader, its 
influence over the other firms, and its effectiveness in 
leading the industry to prices that maximize joint 
profits.
75
 
 
  For this matter, Professor Areeda observes that: 
  
                                                     
74 See Dennis E. Carlton et al., Communication Among Competitors: Game Theory and 
Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 423 (1997). 
75 SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 13, ch. 7, at 248–65. For an in-depth explanation of related 
game theory in economics, see CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 13, ch. 6, at 157–99. 
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“[T]acit coordination” need not imply even a weak 
commitment or prior understanding as to how each will 
behave. [A] price leader may assume that others have 
made a similar calculation about which price will 
maximize profits. Or the leader may simply proceed by 
trial and error: raise the price and see what happens, 
especially where reversing an unfollowed price rise is 
not very costly. Whether this will in fact occur in a 
particular oligopoly depends on many factors. The firms 
may not be all alike. A transaction might be concealed 
from rivals . . . . Many circumstances facilitate or 
impede oligopolistic collaboration.
76
 
 
  The U.S. Supreme Court held in 1927 that “the fact that competitors 
may see proper, in the exercise of their own judgment, to follow the 
prices of another manufacturer, does not establish any suppression of 
competition or show any sinister domination.”77 Following the Supreme 
Court’s lead, the U.S. Courts of Appeals have made more sophisticated 
observations. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that  
 
[s]imilarity of prices in the sale of standardized products such as 
the types of steel involved in this suit will not alone make out a 
prima facie case of collusive price fixing in violation of the 
Sherman Act, the reason being that competition will ordinarily 
cause one producer to charge about the same price that is 
charged by any other.
78
 
   
  More technically, the First Circuit Court of Appeals held that:  
 
[A] firm in a concentrated industry typically has reason 
to decide (individually) to copy an industry leader. After 
all, a higher-than-leader’s price might lead a customer to 
buy elsewhere, while a lower-than-leader’s price might 
simply lead competitors to match the lower price, 
                                                     
76 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, ¶ 1410. 
77 United States v. Int’l. Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693, 708–09 (1927). 
78 Indep. Iron Works, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 322 F.2d 656, 665 (9th Cir. 1963); see also 
Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 815 F.2d 522, 526 (9th Cir. 1987) (Defendant-bank contended 
that “it follows the lead of other major banks because to do otherwise would be against its self-
interest.”). But see Esco Corp. v. United States, 340 F.2d 1000, 1007 (9th Cir. 1965) (finding that the 
evidence proves a conspiracy is more than a simple price leadership). 
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reducing profits for all. One does not need an agreement 
to bring about this kind of follow-the-leader effect in a 
concentrated industry.
79
   
   
  In other words, the price leadership theory postulates that a first 
mover increases prices expecting that others will follow suit since the 
commonly reached industry-wide higher prices would make all the 
competitors better off.
80
 If others do not follow suit, the first mover will 
quickly return to its original price level (assuming that it has the ability 
to do so), in which case the reinstated lower prices would not make them 
better off.
81
 With that understanding, courts assume that uniform or 
parallel price increases in an oligopoly industry are lawful as a rational 
course of doing business or competing with others.
82
 
B. Korean Antitrust Jurisprudence 
  In Korean antitrust cases of the 1980s, defendants did not have any 
chance to advocate the oligopolistic interdependence theory. This was 
mainly because most cases involved the evidence of actual contracts or 
direct evidence, which may have shown defendants’ actual agreement to 
fix prices in concert. It was not until 1992 that defendants began to argue 
that mere interdependent pricing resulted in parallel price increases.
83
 
                                                     
79 Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cir. 1988); see also 
Reserve Supply Corp. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 971 F.2d 37, 53 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(approvingly quoting Clamp-All Corp.).  
80 Ohgae Cheolgang Jejo Eupche Yi Budanghan Gongdong Hangwiye Daehan Geon (5개 
철근제조업체의 부당한 공동행위에 대한 건) [In re Collusion of Five Steel Manufacturing 
Companies], (9509단체 41) [9509DanChe415], Korea Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision 95-100 (June 
5, 1995) (S. Kor.). Here, the KFTC held that the five steel manufacturers are in an oligopoly market 
and the products of steel are almost the same in terms of their quality and sizes. It reasoned that in 
such an industry a demand for one company’s products would decrease if the company were to 
increase prices individually without any agreement with other competitors. The KFTC found that 
this is one of the reasons to support the allegation that that defendants acted in concert to increase 
prices. Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Cf. Arizona v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. (In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum 
Products Antitrust Litigation), 906 F.2d 432, 443 (9th Cir. 1990). In this case, the defendants argued 
that “the price increases were so risky that it is implausible to believe that any firm would have 
undertaken them without some advance agreement from competitors.” Id. As for this argument, the 
court noted that “such an argument may often be valid when the relevant market is highly 
unconcentrated or where the increase cannot be reversed easily or readily without substantial loss of 
goodwill.” Id. 
83 The first case is the DaeRim and Hyosung case. See Daerim Jadongcha Gongeup Jusik 
Hoesa Mit Hyoseong Gigye Gongeup Jusik Hoesa Yi Budanghan Gongdong Hangwiye Daehan 
Geon (대림자동차공업㈜와 효성기계공업㈜의 부당한 공동행위에 대한 건) [In re Collusion 
of DaeRim Automobile Industry Corp. and HyoSung Mechanical Industry Corp.], (9201공 022) 
[9201Gong022], Korea Fair Trade Comm’n, Decision 92-23 (Mar. 9, 1992) (S. Kor.); see also 
KWAN ET AL., supra note 66. 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW      VOLUME 8 
 
21 
 
Subsequently, the theory has been asserted in most cases wherever 
circumstantial evidence was required to establish competitors’ concerted 
price fixing in oligopoly markets.
84
 
  Generally, Korean antitrust tribunals have not accepted the 
oligopolistic interdependence theory until quite recently.
85 
In one parallel 
pricing case,
86
 the KFTC noted that individual price increases would 
result in the reduction of profits and, therefore, are not a rational 
phenomenon where the price is the major force for competition and 
sufficient non-price competition is lacking. The KFTC simply reasoned 
that in such circumstances, when one party increases prices, other parties 
would be better off if they either do not match the increased prices or 
increase prices less than the price levels set by the first price mover. It 
seems that the KFTC’s reasoning has resulted from its unwillingness to 
recognize the technical interactions of oligopolists in determining 
prices.
87
 
  In four recent cases, however, Korean antitrust tribunals appear to 
have accepted the strength of the price leadership theory even though 
                                                     
84 See SON, supra note 49, at 420. 
85 See Samgae Haksaengbuk Jeijo Yepche Yi Yieuishincheongye Daehan Geon (3개 학생복 
제조업체의 이의신청에 대한 건) [In re Reconsideration Request of Three School Uniform 
Manufacturing Companies], (2001심삼 1932) [2001SimSam1932], Korea Fair Trade Comm’n, Re-
Decision 2001-052 (Oct. 16, 2001) (S. Kor.); Seoul Appellate Court [Seoul App. Ct.], 
2001Nu10716, Oct. 17, 2002, (S. Kor.); Yeolhangae Sonhaeboheom Hoesa Yi Yieuishincheongye 
Daehan Geon (11개 손해보험회사의 이의신청에 대한 건) [In re Reconsideration Request of 
Eleven Property Insurance Companies], (2001 심일 2010) [2001SimIl2010], Korea Fair Trade 
Comm’n, Re-Decision 2001-055 (Nov. 3, 2001) (S. Kor.); Seoul Appellate Court [Seoul App. Ct.], 
2002Nu17295, Feb. 3, 2004, (S. Kor.); Neigae Shinyong Card Sayeopja Yi Budanghan Gongdong 
Hangwiye Daehan Geon (4 개 신용카드사업자의 부당한 공동행위에 대한 건) [In re 
Collusion of Four Credit Card Companies], (2002유거 0457) [2002YuGer0457], Korea Fair Trade 
Comm’n, Decision 2002-098 (May 17, 2002) (S. Kor.); Neigae Halbu Geumyoong Sa Yi 
Yieuishincheongye Daehan Geon (4 개 할부금융사의 이의신청에 대한 건) [In re 
Reconsideration Request of Four Installment Financial Companies], (2000 심이 1267) 
[2000SimYi1267], Korea Fair Trade Comm’n, Re-Decision 2001-04 (Jan.17, 2001) (S. Kor.). 
86 See Jongyi Jeijo Samgae Sa Yi Yieuishincheongye Daehan Geon (종이제조 3개사의 
이의신청에 대한 건) [In re Reconsideration Request of Three Paper Manufacturing Companies], 
(9608조삼 1210) [9608JoSam1210], Korea Fair Trade Comm’n, Re-Decision 96-19 (Oct. 15, 1996) 
(S. Kor.). 
87 Rarely have the antitrust tribunals explained why the theory is not applicable to the case in 
question. In a few instances, however, they have alluded to the reasons. When defendants have 
alleged that the theory should be applicable to the present case, the KFTC has oftentimes made an 
alternative argument that the theory has not been well established by adjudication, or that even if the 
theory holds true, there is other direct evidence to effectively support collusive price-fixing. See 
Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2002Du4648, May 27, 2003 (S. Kor.); see also Hwajangji Jeijo Sagae Sa Yi 
Yieuishincheongye Daehan Geon (화장지제조 4 개사의 이의신청에 대한 건) [In re 
Reconsideration Request of Four Sanitary Paper Manufacturing Companies], (9805 심이 0735) 
[9805SimYi0735], Korea Fair Trade Comm’n (July 29, 1998) (S. Kor.) (finding the direct evidence 
that relevant parties’ company bills have the same contents for price increases, and that “concrete 
and clear” evidence is necessary to resolve conscious parallelism cases and implicitly noting that the 
oligopoly pricing theory is abstractive and unclear). 
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their position is slightly different from that of the U.S. antitrust 
jurisprudence. In reconsidering the case, Three Paper Manufacturers, the 
KFTC found that the price increases were reached in coordinated fashion 
merely by interdependent recognition among defendants.
88
 It noted that 
while the list prices were uniform, the medium-quality paper in question 
was a standardized product.
89
 In a separate case involving the collusion 
of seven cement manufacturers, the Seoul Appellate Court overruled the 
KFTC’s decision, holding that the price leader unilaterally increased 
prices at the risk of losing market share, and other manufacturers simply 
followed suit.
90
 
  In two 2002 cases, Dongsuh and Collusion of Four Sanitary Paper 
Manufacturing Companies, the Korean Supreme Court relied upon the 
oligopolistic interdependence theory in reaching its decisions. In 
Dongsuh, two coffee manufacturers had a combined share comprising 99% 
of the Korean market. They increased the prices of coffee products at the 
same time on three occasions. The Korean Supreme Court held that: 
 
It is a matter of course for a firm in the oligopoly market 
to adequately cope with the prices determined by its 
competitors. Once one firm finds that it is for its own 
interest to imitate the competitors’ prices, it can 
independently proceed for the performance without 
mutual agreements or tacit understandings. For that 
reason, the fact that the prices of competitive products are 
uniform or similar in the oligopoly market, standing alone, 
is not sufficient to infer competitors’ agreements or tacit 
understandings.
91
 
 
  After Dongsuh, the Korean Supreme Court decided Collusion of 
Four Sanitary Paper Manufacturing Companies.
92
 In this case, the 
                                                     
88 See Jongyi Jeijo Samgae Sa Yi Yieuishincheongye Daehan Geon (종이제조 3개사의 
이의신청에 대한 건) [In re Reconsideration Request of Three Paper Manufacturing Companies], 
supra note 86. 
89 Id. 
90 The original finding of the KFTC appears in Cement Jeijo Chilgae Sa Yi Yieuishincheongye 
Daehan Geon (시멘트제조 7개사의 이의신청에 대한 건) [In re Reconsideration Request of 
Seven Cement Manufacturing Companies], (9902심이 0247) [9902SimYi0247], Korea Fair Trade 
Comm’n, Re-decision 99-23 (May 4, 1999) (S. Kor.). 
91 Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 99Du6514, Marc. 15, 2002 (S. Kor.). 
92 See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2000Du1386, May 28, 2002 (S. Kor.). For comparison of the 
Dongsuh and Four Sanitary Paper cases, see Sung-Moo Jung, DokJumKyuJe BupSang Chujung 
JoHang Ye Kwan Han Yun Gu (정성무, 독점규제법상 추정조항에 관한 연구) [A Study of 
Presumption Clause under Monopoly Regulation Laws], LL.M. Dissertation, at 87–109 (The Seoul 
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defendants were held liable for concertedly increasing the prices of 
sanitary papers at three different times during relevant periods.
93
 On 
appeal,
94
 defendants argued that the circumstantial evidence introduced 
by plaintiff did not have sufficient probative value to permit an inference 
of concerted action for two reasons: First, defendants had initiated price 
increases by simply expecting subsequent price coordination by other 
competitors; second, the circumstantial evidence was not sufficient to 
show that any tacit understanding had existed among competitors. To 
support that argument, defendants presented the nature of the sanitary 
paper industry in depth by providing various characteristics thereof.
95
 
  The Korean Supreme Court considered the total circumstances and 
characteristics of current situations in the sanitary paper industry. It 
affirmed the Seoul Appellate Court’s finding that the first price increases 
appear to have resulted from the followers’ imitation of the price leader’s 
price increases.
96
 The reviewing courts held, however, that with respect 
to the second and third price increase incidents, price coordination 
experience appears to have been accumulated, and the incidents were not 
mere imitation as in the first price increase.
97
 They reasoned that each 
company’s costs of raw materials and final prices of products had 
increased at the same levels leading to the second and third price 
increases.
98
 
  That decision highlighted a circumstance that can be used to rebut 
the presumption of concerted action. At the same time, the circumstance 
is qualified to limit its potentially far-reaching scope. The reviewing 
courts found that: 
 
                                                                                                                       
Nat’l Univ., 2003). 
93 See Hwajangji Jeijo Sagae Sa Yi Yieuishincheongye Daehan Geon (화장지제조 4개사의 
이의신청에 대한 건) [In re Reconsideration Request of Four Sanitary Paper Manufacturing 
Companies, supra note 87. 
94 Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 98Nu10839, June 20, 2000 (S. Kor.). 
95 The characteristics include (1) actual transaction prices are absolutely different among 
defendants even though the sanitary paper industry traditionally has reached the same list price 
levels many times in order to accept distributors’ requests and facilitate price comparison among 
manufacturers; (2) the composition of raw materials for sanitary paper products is almost the same; 
(3) as most of the raw materials are composed of pulps or old papers that rely on imports, they are 
highly influenced by exchange rates; (4) the combined market shares of the four manufacturers are 
about 85 percent and they are in the oligopoly market; (5) most of the agents for sanitary products 
also sell other companies’ products; (6) as sanitary papers were a necessity, they are subordinated to 
government’s price regulation, and the first price increase in particular is highly affected by the prior 
practices; (7) if the price leader had increased prices, others imitated the price increases by reflecting 
the increases for business strategic reasons; and (8) each company’s fees for sales promotion have 
been increasing as a result of vigorous competition among themselves. Id. 
96 See Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2000Du1386, May 28, 2002 (S. Kor.). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
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[A] presumed illegal price-fixing can be rebutted where 
in oligopoly markets, a price leader determines the price 
levels of products by independent judgment and other 
followers unilaterally imitate the price increases by 
merely acting in concert. The case surely should not apply 
where the leader increases the prices anticipating that if 
the leader initiates the price increases the followers will 
act in concert in light of such market conditions as prior 
business practices.
 99
 
C. European Union and Japanese Antitrust Jurisprudence 
  Under the European Union competition law, Article 81(1) prohibits 
“[a]ll agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of 
undertakings and concerted practices. . . .” 100  To the extent that 
competitors’ parallel pricing does not fit within the meaning of 
agreements or decisions in Article 81(1),
101
 the issue is whether certain 
parallel price increases can be considered concerted practices thereunder. 
  The European Court of Justice discerned between agreements or 
decisions and concerted practices, defining a concerted practice as “a 
form of coordination between undertakings, which, without having been 
taken to the stage where an agreement properly so called has been 
concluded, knowingly substitutes [practical cooperation between them] 
                                                     
99 Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.], 98Nu10839, June 20, 2000 (S. Kor.). Actually, the 
Seoul Appellate Court found three reasons that a presumed concerted action could be rebutted, 
although one of them is relevant here. The other two circumstances are: (1) where the determination 
of the same or similar prices as externally indicated came into existence by coincidental accord even 
if it was independently done by independent business judgments without any explicit or implicit 
agreements or mutual understandings; and (2) where relevant defendants inevitably acted at the same 
or similar time in the same or similar way to the extent that certain external factors commonly 
related to other competitors have affected their determinations of price levels in the same fashion. 
The case should not apply, the Court noted, where although the external factors somehow affected 
each firm differently, the firms affected by the external factors proceeded to the same or similar 
concerted action by taking advantage of the tacit understanding that they will act in concert. After 
this decision, the reviewing courts followed the rebuttable circumstantial evidence. See Seoul 
Appellate Court [Seoul App. Ct.], 99Nu10898, June 5, 2001 (S. Kor.); see also Supreme Court [S. 
Ct.], 2001Du5552, Dec. 12, 2003 (S. Kor.). 
100 Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community, 2002 O.J. (C325) 1, 64. The “undertakings” generally mean parties or firms, 
but do not include persons, meaning officers or directors of firms. See Case C-364/92, SAT 
Fluggesellschaft v. Eurocontrol, 1994 E.C.R. I-55; see generally RALPH H. FOLSOM, PRINCIPLES OF 
EUROPEAN UNION LAW 320–29 (2005) (discussing Article 81’s approach to a firm with a dominant 
position in a market). 
101 Like in Korean and U.S. antitrust jurisprudence, written or oral agreements, or even a 
simple handshake were found to suffice to establish a concerted action. See Case 28/77, Tepea BV v. 
Comm’n, 1978 E.C.R. 1391; see also Case 41/69, ACF Chemiefarma v. Comm’n, 1970 E.C.R. 661. 
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for the risks of competition. . . .”102 The European Commission held that 
the disclosure of courses of market conduct intended for adoption by 
others is prohibited.
103
 
  In the well-known 1993 Wood Pulp case, however, the European 
Court of Justice found that “[the European Union competition law] does 
not deprive economic operators of the right to adapt themselves 
intelligently to the existing and anticipated conduct of their 
competitors.”104 In that case where the European Commission had found 
defendants liable for concertedly increasing wood pulp prices, the 
European Court of Justice held that “the parallelism of prices and the 
price trends may be satisfactorily explained by the oligopolistic 
tendencies of the market and by the specific circumstances prevailing in 
certain periods.” 105  Relying upon expert testimony about the 
oligopolistic market structure, the court found that “[t]he producers know 
that, if they were to increase their prices, their competitors would no 
doubt refrain from following suit and thus lure their customers away.”106 
  A more recent report of the European Commission suggests that the 
Wood Pulp court’s judgment should be “nuanced.” 107  The report 
summarizes the current legal proposition by saying, “parallel conduct 
does not in itself constitute proof of a concerted practice, but can be used 
as strong evidence of the existence of an anticompetitive agreement if 
such behavior does not correspond to the normal adaptation of market 
operations to market conditions.” 108  Indeed, some recent European 
Union cases have conformed to that proposition.
109
 
  Japanese antitrust law has two theories that imply where a concerted 
action from consciously parallel conduct should be found. They are the 
intention communication theory, and the common understanding 
                                                     
102 See Case C-40/73, Suiker Unie UA v. Comm’n, 1975 E.C.R. 1668; see also Case C-89/85, 
Osakeyhtiö v. Comm’n, 1993 E.C.R. I-1576; Cartonboard, 1994 O.J. L 243/1; Pre-Insulated Pipe 
Cartel, O.J. L 24/1, 129–134 (1999). 
103 Suiker Unie, supra note 102. This proposition appears to be the same as that of the 
qualification found by the Korean Supreme Court in the Four Sanitary Paper Case. Supreme Court 
[S. Ct.], 2000Du1386, May 28, 2002 (S. Kor.) 
104 Osakeyhtiö, supra note 102. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107  Oligopoly, Round Table Series, Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, DAFFE/CLP(99)25, at 213–14 (1999). 
108 Id. at 214.  
109 See Pre-Insulated Pipe Cartel, supra note 102; see also Case C-204/00, Aalborg Portland 
A/S v. Comm’n, 2004 E.C.R. I-403. To understand the development history of how antitrust 
tribunals have handled concerted practices, see Julian M. Joshua & Sarah Jordan, Combinations, 
Concerted Practices and Cartels: Adopting the Concept of Conspiracy in European Community 
Competition Law, 24 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 647 (Spring 2004). 
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theory.
110
 The intention communication theory states that although there 
is no direct evidence, the substance of parallel conduct can be inferred if 
there existed a communication among competitors.
111
 Under this theory, 
communication infers parallel conduct if it can be shown that there were 
meetings, communications, or information exchanges in any fashion that 
cause competitors to act in concert. If there was no actual communication 
among competitors, parallel conduct itself is not enough to constitute an 
illegal concerted action. 
  In contrast, the common understanding theory does not demand 
actual communications among competitors. Relevant competitors’ 
communication of an intention to increase prices can be found when 
parallel conduct would not exist in the absence of communication 
considering the substance of parallel conduct. The recent Toshiba 
Chemical Corporation case is illustrative of the common understanding 
theory.
112
 
  In that case, Toshiba Chemical Corporation and seven other 
companies were held liable for raising in concert the delivery prices of 
copper-plated phenol paper laminate.
113
 The evidence showed that the 
companies met with one another to exchange opinions of ways to 
stabilize the decline of sales prices and to increase the prices of copper-
plated laminate for printed circuit boards.
114
 There was also evidence the 
eight companies increased the prices subsequent to the meeting.
115
 In its 
appeal, Toshiba Chemical argued for the lack of substantial evidence to 
support the existence of concerted action.
116
 
  The Tokyo High Court clarified the circumstances in which a 
concerted action may be found in parallel pricing cases. It held: 
 
                                                     
110 GWAJEON SIJANG YE YITEOSEO YI CARTEL GYUJIE YI GWAJEI (과점시장에 있어서의 
카르텔 규제의 과제) [THE PROBLEMS OF CARTEL REGULATION IN OLIGOPOLY MARKETS]; 
GONGJEONG GEORAE GWANRYEON KUKWOI JARYO SAREI BUNSEOK MOEUMJIP (III) (공정거래 관련 
국외자료, 사례분석 모음집 (III)) [THE COMPENDIUM III OF FAIR TRADE RELATED OVERSEAS 
MATERIALS AND CASE ANALYSIS]; GONGJEONG GEORAE SAMPAN GWANRIGWAN 
(공정거래위원회 심판관리관) [THE KOREA FAIR TRADE COMMISSION JUDGMENT MANAGEMENT 
DIVISION ], at 168–85 (2001). 
111 See HUR, supra note 49. 
112 In re Toshiba Chemical Corp., The Tokyo High Court Judgment, September 25, 1995; see 
also In re Asahi Newspaper Companies and 26 Other Companies, the Tokyo High Court Judgment 
1995 (Decision File: Volume 4, at 145) (The original decision of the JFTC is found in that same 
volume, at 4); In re Five Kraft Liner Manufacturing Companies, the Japanese Fair Trade 
Commission, Decision, June 5, 1981 (Decision File, Volume 28–32). 
113 Toshiba Chemical Corp., supra note 112. 
114 Id. 
115 Id.  
116 Id.  
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“Communication of intent” is the mutual recognition or 
anticipation of a price increase by multiple entrepreneurs 
for the same products or services, and the intention to act 
upon this in accordance with others. . . . Mutual 
recognition of other entrepreneurs’ price increases and 
silent acceptance is interpreted as sufficient evidence (this 
is said to be “communication of intent” through tacit 
means). Unless there are special circumstances 
demonstrating that a certain entrepreneur made 
independent decisions that it can withstand price 
competition in the trading market without regard for the 
behavior of other entrepreneurs, we should presume that 
these entrepreneurs have mutual intentions of adopting 
collusive behavior, and that there was “communication of 
intent.”117 
 
  The Court dismissed Toshiba Chemical’s appeal, holding that there 
was sufficient evidence to show the required communication of intent.
118
 
In practice, however, a majority of courts are in line with the intention 
communication theory requiring actual communications among 
competitors.
119
 
  The reasoning of the European Court of Justice in the Wood Pulp 
case is almost the same as that of Korean antitrust jurisprudence. It is 
similar to that of the U.S. antirust jurisprudence except for one fine 
distinction between Korean or European Union’s antitrust law and U.S. 
antitrust law. The distinction, found in alternative ways of detecting 
oligopoly pricing, might produce different outcomes.  
  Except where circumstances may require otherwise, U.S. antitrust 
jurisprudence generally assumes that it is a normal course of business to 
follow a price leader’s price increase and thus finds oligopoly pricing 
lawful.
120
  
  Conversely, Korean and European Union antitrust courts are 
generally likely to find that if a first mover increases the product prices 
                                                     
117 Excerpted from the report of Oligopoly, Round Table Series, Organization for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, supra note 107, at 213–14 (1999). 
118 Toshiba Chemical Corp., supra note 112. 
119  See MYOUNG-JO YANG, BUDANGHAN GONGDONGHAENGWI CHUJUNGJOHANG YI 
HAPRIJUK JUKYOUNG BANGAN YUNGU (양명조, 부당한 공동행위 추정 조항의 합리적 
적용방안 연구) [THE PLAN FOR REASONABLE APPLICATION OF THE PRESUMPTION CLAUSE UNDER 
UNFAIR CONCERTED ACTION] (THE TASK FORCE REPORT OF THE KOREA FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, 
THE KOREA FAIR TRADE COMMISSION ARCHIVE, at 15–25 (1995). 
120 See Yao & DeSanti, supra note 18, at 113–42. 
SPRING 2012                                    Antitrust Economics 
 
28 
 
in a particular oligopoly industry, other market players may not increase 
the product prices in tandem or match the increased prices. By choosing 
not to do so, others can take the first mover’s customers away. The 
normal market behavior here is that competitors do not follow the first 
mover’s price increases; by following the mover to increase prices they 
may be acting against their own self interests. 
  Of practical significance is that under the viewpoint of Korean or 
European Union jurisprudence, competitors’ parallel pricing in an 
oligopoly market is likely to be viewed suspiciously. At the litigation 
stage, it is the defendant’s burden to show the absence or lack of 
variations or limitations that may invalidate the price leadership theory in 
general. It is also the first mover’s ability to return to the original price 
level without losing market share or profits in particular. By contrast, a 
counterpart U.S. defendant may be allowed to merely allege the 
operation of the oligopoly pricing theory. 
  If a court believes that price coordination in oligopoly markets is a 
natural market phenomenon, it can obviate any viable claim of concerted 
action on the part of plaintiff. Regardless of the theory’s validity, Korean 
and European Union antitrust jurisprudence, and the common 
understanding theory under Japanese antitrust law, parallel pricing may 
be reached with the premise that circumstances can establish relevant 
parties’ tacit price coordination possibilities, that is, their connected and 
subjective mental intent to collude.
121
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 In Korean antitrust law, it seems clear that any viable future 
legislation could not possibly encompass every conceivable plus factor. 
The evolving marketplace and the diversifying of market players’ 
conduct create substantially different fact patterns and shape 
considerably diverging economic theories. It is impossible for any 
particular piece of legislation to keep abreast of the rapidly changing 
market phenomena.
122
 Further, even with enumerated plus factors, 
antitrust tribunals have yet to reach conclusions of law from findings of 
facts in conscious parallelism cases.
123
 To make reasonable and 
                                                     
121 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 93–94 (2d ed. 2001); see also In re High 
Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 662–66 (7th Cir. 2002). 
122 For an insightful explanation of dynamic but legitimate business conduct, see PORTER, 
supra note 18. 
123 See SON, supra note 49. 
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predictable economic analysis of the proffered evidence, a more 
sophisticated analytical framework must be properly delineated and 
developed on a case-by-case basis.
124
 
A. Ascertaining the Scope of Additional Evidence 
  For inferential proof of collusion, the adduced evidence may be 
divided into the four types: (1) direct evidence; (2) circumstantial 
evidence; (3) evidence to show interdependence; and (4) evidence of plus 
factors. Different definitions are used for the terminologies that describe 
the types of evidence. Few doubt that direct evidence is understood as 
any contract or evidence that competitors actually agreed to increase 
prices (for example, witness statements or testimony of direct contacts 
among competitors—so-called smoking-gun evidence). 
 However, courts sometimes pigeonhole additional evidence, 
circumstantial evidence, or plus factors in disparate fashion. The term 
additional evidence is employed in three different ways. On one side, 
additional evidence measures evidence that supports the direct evidence 
only by dint of conduct or circumstances (for example, opportunities for 
competitors to meet). The evidence used in that manner does not include 
either evidence to show interdependence by market structures or 
evidence of plus factors.
125
 On the other hand, additional evidence may 
mean any sort of evidence—including evidence to support the existence 
of direct evidence, evidence to show interdependence, and other plus 
factors. In the middle is the view that evidence to show interdependence 
and other plus factors go together under the conceptual umbrella of 
additional evidence. 
  The meaning of additional evidence is as variable as that of plus 
factors.
126
 In the broadest sense, a relevant plus factor is any evidence 
except direct evidence. In this sense, circumstantial evidence is 
equivalent to plus factors. In the narrowest sense, circumstantial 
                                                     
124 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (5th ed. 1998); see also 
Hochberg, supra note 6, at 161–68 (arguing that “[s]ome of the nation’s economic and legal talent 
should take some time off from opining about economic issues and enlarging our fund of knowledge 
… and, instead, devote their considerable skill and energy to trying to generate data and develop 
simple rules and presumptions to resolve the great majority of cases, be they mergers or restraints or 
other conduct under the Sherman Act”). 
125 See AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 8, paras. 1410–15. 
126 See DAE-SIK HONG, KWAJUM SIJANG YESEUYI HAYYI YI CHUJUNG KWA GYI BUNBOK 
(과점시장에서의 합의의 추정과 그 번복) [PRESUMING AND REBUTTING AGREEMENT IN THE 
OLIGOPOLY MARKET]; Gyeongjei Bup Panrei Yeongu Jei 1 Gwan (경제법판례연구 제 1 권) 
[Economic Law Case Study vol. 1]; Gyeongjei Bup Panrei Yeongu Hoe (경제법판례연구회) 
[Economic Law Case Study Society], ch. 3 (2004). 
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evidence, evidence to establish interdependence, and plus factors are 
considered three unconnected concepts. For analysis purposes, 
circumstantial evidence may be broken down into two parts in light of 
the characters that relevant evidence possesses: noneconomic or 
conspiracy evidence (e.g., opportunity to collude) and economic 
evidence (e.g., concentrated market structure).
127
 To avoid confusion in 
antitrust analysis, the following definitions are clarified at the outset: 
 
(1) Direct evidence: Any uncontested evidence that show the 
competitors agreed on price increases by inter-firm meetings, 
which does not need any help from other evidence in finding 
unlawful price-fixing. 
 
(2) Circumstantial evidence: Any type of evidence to 
indicate the competitors’ concerted conduct for price-fixing, 
which is divided into three parts as shown above; (i) 
evidence to support the direct evidence; (ii) evidence to 
establish interdependence; and (iii) plus factors as defined 
below. 
 
(3) Evidence to establish interdependence: Economic 
evidence of market structures that show the competitors’ 
interdependence. 
 
(4) Plus factors: Economic evidence of not only structural 
features but also market players’ conduct or performance that 
may strengthen or weaken the existence of price-fixing.
128
 
B. Constructing Groundwork for Analysis 
  Table 2 shows general analytical steps to take when considering 
circumstantial evidence for the task of inferring concerted conduct from 
parallel pricing. In a typical collusive parallel pricing case, we start with 
direct or anecdotal evidence of parallel price movements and inter-firm 
contacts. If the smoking gun evidence of meetings, letters, or fax 
                                                     
127 See POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, supra note 121, at 69–93. For an observation of the relevant 
dichotomy between conspiracy theory and other methods, see Randall David Marks, Can 
Conspiracy Theory Solve the “Oligopoly Problem?”, 45 MD. L. REV. 387 (1986). 
 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW      VOLUME 8 
 
31 
 
transmittals among competitors is sufficiently credible, we should not be 
concerned about circumstantial evidence. In most cases, however, direct 
evidence is subject to different interpretations. This is problematic 
because antitrust tribunals generally require clear-cut evidence of actual 
agreements. For that reason, evidence of inter-firm contact functions as 
circumstantial evidence to corroborate the existence of concerted conduct. 
TABLE 2. The Analytical Steps According to the Types of Evidence 
   
  Mere parallel pricing can constitute conscious parallel pricing if 
Evidence 
Requirements Implications 
Direct 
1.Opportunity 
to collude 
Sufficient 
particularities 
If found not credible, 
becomes 
circumstantial 
evidence 
2. Parallel 
pricing 
Significant 
identities, 
simultaneities 
If found significant 
enough, a viable 
claim may be shown 
To Show 
inter-
dependence 
 
3. Market 
structure 
 
Signs of 
collusion: 
concentration or 
limiting 
variables 
Economic plausibility 
of whether collusive 
price-fixing may be 
assumed from the 
structural features 
Plus factors - 
To Infer 
price-fixing 
from market 
phenomena 
Facilitating or 
impeding 
coordination 
Circumstances that 
may make concerted 
conduct more likely 
than not 
4. Market 
players’ 
conduct 
Acting against 
defendant’s 
economic self-
interests 
The validity and 
extent of whether 
independent business 
justifications 
undermine alleged 
concerted conduct 
5. Industrial 
performance 
Prior and 
existing 
outward looks 
Anticompetitive 
results being more or 
less consistent with 
concerted conduct 
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evidence of interdependence can be shown.
129
 In the Table above, the 
first three numbered elements in the Evidence column are united to 
satisfy the notion of interdependence. In general, we consider pertinent 
market attributes in the industry where alleged conspirators exist for 
purposes of finding out the interplay and magnitude of a couple of 
facets—the significant circumstances that make the market highly 
concentrated and variables that can offset the tendency of price 
coordination. More specifically, analysis of the first facet allows us to see 
the place where relevant competitors are predestined to play; that is, the 
specific structural setting where they are playing with one another. The 
second facet intends to uncover certain hurdles that can hinder the 
convergent orders inside the concentration core conducive to collusion. 
Therefore, the degree of interaction may predictably lead us to apprehend 
a signal of price fixing in a particular industry. 
  Collusive price fixing leaves clues that must be acted upon. In 
conjunction with the interdependence evidence, we need additional 
evidence or plus factors to reinforce or counteract the conspiratorial 
characteristics found in that particular marketplace. Broadly construed, 
all the plus factors have the common function of showing competitive or 
noncompetitive economic phenomena, which are subject to divergent 
interpretations. A relevant defense argument here is that the parallel price 
movements, though significant, are justified in terms of valid business 
purposes. This defense is applicable to all initial offenses that a plaintiff 
may bring forward to establish concerted conduct of alleged conspirators. 
The question then becomes: How should we supply operative economic 
contents in performing the antitrust law’s analytical works with 
additional evidence in terms that can be understood and applied within 
the economic context? 
C. Price Leadership Theory 
 To the extent that other anecdotal and economic evidence permits an 
inference of illegal price fixing, the argument that mere interdependent 
pricing caused price increases in parallel fashion does not end the cases. 
Judicial recognition of the price leadership theory, however, can have a 
considerable influence over the outcome of litigation. The theory teaches 
that competitors may naturally and inherently get to uniform or parallel 
pricing even in the absence of agreements. 
                                                     
129 For a keen comparison of different determinants between concentrated industries and 
fragmented industries, see PORTER, supra note 18, at 3–33, 191–200. 
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 The price leadership theory, in its function, empowers defendants to 
forge ahead in a couple of ways. Given the oligopolistic market structure 
or the highly competitive nature of homogeneous products, defendants 
can simply allege that it is inevitable for the industry to stick to uniform 
pricing. They can also allege that substantial additional evidence must be 
established with significant price coordination to find illegal price fixing. 
If an antitrust tribunal believes in the strength of the theory, it may tip the 
balance in favor of the defendants, particularly where the facts suggest 
that a benign explanation for price increases is equally plausible with a 
collusive explanation. As a result, the theory—if found to be valid—can 
effectively challenge every endeavor on the part of the plaintiff to 
establish the conspiratorial nature of parallel pricing. 
 U.S. courts have the tendency to assume the theory’s operation in 
deciding parallel pricing cases, whereas Korean and European Union 
tribunals are just starting to take the theory seriously in conscious 
parallelism adjudication. Japanese antirust jurisprudence by and large 
focuses on the existence of an actual communication of intent among 
relevant competitors, rather than relying on the oligopoly pricing theory 
for purposes of inferring concerted conduct from competitors’ parallel 
pricing. 
 The different beliefs imply that defendants in Korea or the European 
Union may bear the higher burden of establishing the theory’s validity 
than their U.S. counterparts. In fact, Korean antitrust practice has 
revealed that defendant businesses are required to show that the theory 
applies in terms of a particular industry’s structure, conduct, and 
performance. Therefore, it seems obvious that the outcome of similar 
parallel pricing cases is likely to be affected in part by whether and to 
what extent an antitrust bench is willing to accept the theory’s strengths 
and weaknesses under the circumstances. 
